Seth, Anil K. (2016) Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out. Animal
Sentience 3(14)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1038

Date of submission: 2015-10-08
Date of acceptance: 2015-12-13

This article has appeared in the journal Animal
Sentience, a peer-reviewed journal on animal
cognition and feeling. It has been made open access,
free for all, by WellBeing International and deposited
in the WBI Studies Repository. For more information,
please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

Animal Sentience 2016.020: Seth Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out
Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

Anil K. Seth
School of Engineering and Informatics
University of Sussex
Abstract: Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether
the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish.
This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may
depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural
evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if
fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering
obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence
where doubt remains.
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Key (2016) argues that fish do not consciously experience pain, on the general basis that
brain mechanisms supporting conscious pain reports in humans cannot be identified in fish.
It is refreshing to see a discussion of non-mammalian consciousness well informed by
relevant (although mostly human) neurobiology. However, Key goes too far in making the
strong inference against the existence of fish pain, for several reasons: (i) the biophysical
substrates of conscious states (including pain and suffering) in any species, including
humans, cannot yet be confidently identified; (ii) uncertainty about the mechanisms of
human consciousness complicates the evaluation of potentially homologous processes in
other species; and (iii) given this uncertainty, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering
imposes moral and ethical imperatives (i.e., the precautionary principle) to be
accommodating towards the possibility of its existence. There are also more positive reasons
to consider that fish pain exists which fit comfortably with emerging Bayesian brain theories
that emphasize active regulation of physiological homeostasis (Seth, 2015).
Key’s argument can be summarized as follows. In humans, pain reports, indicating conscious
pain, causally depend on specific cortical regions. This causal dependence, empirically
supported by various brain lesion, imaging, and stimulation data, arises in virtue of specific
structural and functional indicators of conscious processing within these regions. On a
functional level, these include signal amplification and global integration across time and
space. The structural properties proposed to support these functional indicators include
parcellation of neural tissue into distinct (pain-related) regions; widespread recurrent
connectivity among these regions, supported by discrete regional laminar and columnar
organization; and topographical coding of pain-related information. Fish, the argument goes,
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lack plausible homologs of these properties and so the best interpretation of the current
state of affairs is that fish do not consciously feel pain.
While this argument might seem to be about pain specifically, it is actually about
consciousness generally. If fish lack the ability to consciously feel pain, it is (according to Key)
because they lack the neuronal mechanisms needed to consciously experience (i.e., feel)
anything at all, where these mechanisms are specified by the various structural and
functional properties just mentioned. Thus Key’s real claim, as I read it, is that fish do not
consciously experience pain because they are wholly unconscious organisms sustained and
guided by a highly adapted suite of reflex (including nociceptive) responses: Key’s fish are
philosophical zombie fish.
Can we be confident that the neuronal criteria identified by Key are necessary for conscious
states? On one reading, Key seems to suggest that having a mammalian-like neocortex is
necessary for consciousness. This strong position is easily challenged by a wealth of evidence
from non-mammalian species like birds and cephalopods which display complex cognition
and behaviour consistent with consciousness (D. B. Edelman & Seth, 2009).
A more interesting interpretation is that the neocortex is important for mammalian
consciousness in virtue of supporting specific functional properties like signal amplification
(“ignition”) and global integration. In human studies, much evidence supports the
involvement of these properties in reportable conscious perception (Boly et al., 2013;
Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). Here it is important to distinguish between those mechanisms
underlying explicit report from those that underlie the generation of the conscious scene
itself (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012; de Graaf, Hsieh, & Sack, 2012). Indeed, there
has been recent excitement about “no report” paradigms, where the frontal cortical
activations typically associated with conscious percepts (in humans) are no longer observed
when participants are not required to report their conscious states (Frassle, Sommer, Jansen,
Naber, & Einhauser, 2014; see also Brascamp, Blake, & Knapen, 2015, for a similar story
regarding parietal activation ). Clearly, it would be a mistake to deny other species conscious
states on the basis that they lack the neural machinery to report these states, independently
of their ability to experience them (Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005). And it is entirely possible
that, should global integration and amplification turn out to be necessary for consciousness,
these properties could be supported by alternative neuronal architectures in nonmammalian species (D. B. Edelman & Seth, 2009).
Other criteria mentioned by Key are less readily associated with conscious report specifically.
Strong local recurrence, perhaps dependent on specific laminar and columnar organization
and bidirectional signal flow (Bastos et al., 2015), does seem consistently to be associated
with conscious perception (Lamme, 2010) but is also a rather generic property of cortical and
thalamocortical anatomy (Markov et al., 2013; Murphy, Duckett, & Sillito, 1999). Other
prominent theories of consciousness like “integrated information theory” (Tononi, 2008)
associate consciousness with information-theoretic quantities which in principle can be
realized by highly generic physical systems, including even non-biological artifacts (Tononi &
Koch, 2015).
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Might fish pain then depend on a different biophysical realization than human pain? On the
face of it, this seems reasonable since conscious fish pain (if it exists) is likely to be
qualitatively different from, and less differentiated than, human pain and suffering. Key
excludes this possibility by saying that conscious fish pain of any kind would require the
minimal neuronal architecture that he has already excluded from fish, where this minimal
neuronal architecture is required for having conscious states of any kind. This again returns
the argument to the basic, and unsolved, question of the neural substrates of consciousness
in general, and away from a specific focus on pain.
Are there any positive reasons why fish might feel pain or have conscious experiences? Here
it is useful to return to an evolutionary perspective on the functions of consciousness and of
pain perception. While the function(s) of consciousness remain unestablished (just like its
necessary and sufficient neural mechanisms), one plausible candidate is that conscious
scenes integrate a broad range of organism-relevant signals in the service of flexible and
adaptive behaviour (G. M. Edelman, 2003; Seth, 2009). As fish studies progress, it is apparent
that many fish species have surprisingly sophisticated cognitive and behavioural repertoires,
including long-term memory, social learning and cooperation, and even tool use (Brown,
2015). But the specific experience of pain speaks to something much more basic, which is
the preservation of the integrity of the organism when under threat. In this light the ability
to consciously feel pain would support the adaptive coordination of flexible responses to
mitigate threats to physiological homeostasis, beyond that which can be supported by
automatic nociceptive reflexes. Key might point out that fish sometimes do not display
flexible responses to noxious stimuli, for instance in not showing obvious behaviour
suppression following invasive craniotomy. Against this, other evidence suggests that fish
show attention-related cognitive changes, for example, losing a normal fear of novel objects,
following injection with acetic acid (Sneddon, 2003; see also Brown, 2015). In any case one
might expect considerable cross-species variation in responses to pain (Reilly, Quinn,
Cossins, & Sneddon, 2008).
The active preservation of homeostatic integrity is a highly conserved evolutionary
imperative which provides a rationale for the existence of basic conscious states
characterized by affective qualia including pain (Panksepp, 2005). In humans, these affective
conscious states leverage phylogenetically ancient brain regions and neurotransmitter
systems which have more plausible homologs in non-mammalian species (including some
fish) than the more recent neocortical extensions associated with “higher order” aspects of
human consciousness (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Demski, 2013; D. B. Edelman & Seth,
2009). More speculatively, recent Bayesian theories of interoception and autonomic
regulation (Seth, 2013, 2015) suggest that active regulation of physiological homeostasis
may instantiate basic experiences of embodied selfhood which extend beyond modalityspecific experiences, and which in doing so may mediate a transition from pain to subjective
suffering.
Do fish consciously feel pain? On the one hand, the lack of readily identifiable homologs of
neural mechanisms associated with mammalian consciousness means we cannot assert
definitely that fish are conscious. On the other, as we understand more about the
mechanisms underlying human (and mammalian) consciousness, we will be better at
assessing whether alternative realizations in other more distant species can do the same job.
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Other considerations, including those concerning active preservation of physiological
integrity, provide positive reasons to believe in the possibility of fish consciousness. Should
we then give fish “the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and unconditionally bestow them with the
ability to feel pain?” as Key asks rhetorically. The right response is to say Yes to the first part,
and No to the (hyperbolic) second part. Our current state of ignorance about consciousness
together with the precautionary principle obliges us to take seriously that fish may feel pain
or may suffer. And we are equally obliged to continue our efforts to understand the general
neural mechanisms of consciousness, to dissolve our ignorance, so that crucial questions like
those raised by Key can be resolved in a principled way.
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